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Willis LeGrand Lee III, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for forcible sexual abuse, a second 
degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) 
(West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Where Defendant pled guilty and never moved to withdraw his guilty 
plea, does this Court have jurisdiction to consider his plea-related claims? 
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies. 
2(a). Where Defendant asserts he was incompetent at sentencing, was the trial 
court's imposition of the statutory prison term legal? 
Standard of review. "Whether a sentence is illegal... is ... review[ed] ... for 
correctness/' State v. Garner, 2008 UT App 32,110,177 P.3d 637 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted) (third ellipses in original). 
2(b). Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance at sentencing by not 
asserting that Defendant was incompetent to be sentenced? 
Standard of Review. " When a question of trial counsel ineffectiveness is raised 
for the first time on appeal and the review is confined to the trial court record, the 
question of ineffectiveness of counsel is a matter of law, to be reviewed for 
correctness/7 State v. Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550, 554 (Utah App. 1993); see also State v. 
Perry, 2009 UT App 51, f 9,204 P.3d 880. " [Defendant bears the burden of assuring 
the record is adequate" to review his claim of ineffectiveness. State v. Litherland, 
2000 UT 76, If 16,12 P.3d 92. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. CONST. Amend. VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged Defendant with one count each of rape, a first degree 
felony, and furnishing alcohol to a minor, a class B misdemeanor. Rl. Pursuant to a 
2 
plea bargain, Defendant pled guilty to one count of forcible sexual abuse, a second 
degree felony. R83-89. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve one-to-fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. R93-94; R102:13-16. 
Defendant never moved to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R99. 
Thereafter, Defendant filed a remand motion under rule 23B, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, which was denied. See Order dated 5 April 2010. * 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant took seventeen-year-old L.D. into his garage and got her so drunk 
she was blacking out. R102:4. He then took her to his room and sexually abused 
her. Rl; R84; R102:4. When he was finished Defendant boasted, "I've had 
younger/' R102:4. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant pleaded guilty to forcible sexual abuse and never moved to 
withdraw his guilty plea. Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review his 
claim that the trial court failed to adequately explore his pre-plea complaint that 
1
 Defendant sought remand to develop facts relative to his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel regarding the taking of his guilty plea, but he did not seek 
remand to develop facts relative to his claim of ineffective assistance at sentencing. 
See Rule 23B Motion dated 23 February 2010. See also this Court's Order dated 5 
April 2010. 
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trial counsel was coercing him to plead guilty, and his claim that the trial court 
filaed to strictly comply with rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal of Procedure, in 
accepting his guilty plea. Defendant's failure to timely move for withdrawal of his 
guilty plea also precludes review of his claims that trial counsel was ineffective 
because he coerced Defendant to plead guilty and thereafter refused to move for 
withdrawal of the plea. Indeed, the jurisdictional bar extends to all challenges to the 
validity of the a guilty plea, including claims of plain error and ineffective assistance 
in the plea process. 
While the Court may review Defendant's claims that his sentence was illegal 
because he was incompetent at sentencing, and that trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance at sentencing by not asserting that Defendant was 
incompetent, both claims lack merit. They lack merit, first, because both are based 
on the assumption that Defendant had a right to be competent at sentencing. But 
Defendant cites no supporting authority for that proposition. Second, even 
assuming that Defendant could show a right to be competent at sentencing, the 
record is devoid of evidence that he was incompetent. Consequently, Defendant's 
claims that his prison sentence is illegal because he was incompetent to be sentenced 
is unsupported by the law and the record and should be rejected. 
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The same is true of Defendant's claim of ineffectiveness. Defendant has not 
shown, and cannot show, on this record that trial counsel rendered either deficient 
or prejudicial performance when, recognizing that Defendant was likely to be 
incarcerated, he asked the trial court to include needed sex-offender therapy and 
substance-abuse counseling in the commitment order. 
ARGUMENT 
L 
WHERE DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY AND NEVER MOVED TO 
WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA, THIS COURT LACKS 
JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER HIS PLEA-RELATED CLAIMS 
In Point I of his brief, Defendant alleges that the trial court failed to 
adequately explore his pre-plea complaints that his lawyer was coercing him to 
accept the plea bargain. See Aplt. Br. at 14-27. In Point II of his brief, Defendant 
alleges that the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11(e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal of Procedure, in accepting his guilty plea. See Aplt. Br. at 27-34. And in 
Point III of his brief, Defendant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective because he 
(1) coerced Defendant to plead guilty; and (2) refused to move to withdraw the 
guilty plea. Aplt. Br. at 34-41. Because Defendant pled guilty and never moved to 
withdraw his plea, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review any of these plea-related 
claims, including Defendant's claim that the trial court failed to adequately 
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investigate his pre-plea complaint about his lawyer. This is so because Defendant's 
only complaint about his lawyer was that he was coercing Defendant to plead 
guilty, see, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 17-19, 21, 24-26, which is, in effect, a challenge to the 
validity of the plea. 
The plea-withdrawal statute governs the basis and timing for a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010). A 
guilty plea "may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it 
was not knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a). A 
request to withdraw a guilty plea must "be made by motion before sentence is 
announced." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b). "Any challenge to a guilty plea not 
made within the time period specified in [the statute] shall be pursued under Title 
78B, Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(c). 
Here, Defendant's failure to file a timely motion to withdraw his plea 
extinguished his opportunity to challenge his guilty plea in his criminal case and on 
direct appeal. The Utah Supreme Court has recently reiterated that "failure to 
withdraw a guilty plea within the time frame dictated by section 77-13-6 deprives 
the trial court and appellate courts of jurisdiction to review the validity of the plea." 
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State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, f 18,647 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (citing State v. Rkinehart, 2007 UT 
61, \ \ 12-14,167 P.3d 1046). 
This jurisdictional time limit applies to all challenges to the validity of a guilty 
plea, including claims of plain error and ineffective assistance in the plea process. 
See Ott, 2010 UT 1,118; State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61,114,167 P.3d 1046; State v. 
Reyes, 2002 UT 13, f f 3-4, 40 P.3d 630. The jurisdictional bar thus extends to 
Defendant's claims that the trial court failed to (1) adequately explore his pre-plea 
complaints that trial counsel was coercing him to plead guilty, which is essentially a 
challenge to the validity of the plea, and (2) strictly comply with rule 11(e) in 
accepting the plea. Although Defendant couches his claim that the trial court failed 
to adequately investigate his pre-plea complaint about his lawyer as Pursifell error, 
in effect, it is an attack on the validity of his guilty plea, and no more than a 
variation of his claim that trial counsel was ineffective because he coerced him to 
plead guilty.2 All of Defendant's challenges thus amount to attacks on the validity 
of his guilty plea. As noted, the jurisdictional bar extends to all plea-related claims, 
including claims of plea-related ineffective assistance of counsel. It thus extends to 
Defendant's claims that trial counsel was ineffective for coercing him to take the 
2
 See State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270 (1987). 
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plea and refusing to move for its withdrawal. Where, as here, Defendant never 
moved to withdraw his guilty plea, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider any 
claim on appeal except a challenge to the sentence, See Ott, 2010 UT 1, | 18; 
Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, f 15; Reyes, 2002 UT 13, f f 3-4. 
Defendant recognizes as much. See Aplt. Br. at 27. Acknowledging that his 
complaints about the validity of his guilty plea cannot surmount the jurisdictional 
bar, Defendant asks this Court to hold that the trial court's alleged failure to 
investigate his complaints about counsel's alleged coercion "resulted] in per se 
error that requires reversal." Id. (emphasis in original). Absent such a holding from 
this Court, Defendant asserts that he is without any remedy to the jurisdictional bar. 
Id. But Defendant has already availed himself of his remedy. A post-conviction 
petition that apparently challenges the voluntariness of Defendant's guilty plea and 
the effectiveness of trial counsel is pending in the district court. See Aplt. Br. at 20; 
see also Fifth District Court Docket (Case No. 100500082), attached in Addendum B. 
In sum, because Defendant pled guilty and never moved to withdraw his 
guilty plea, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Defendant's plea-related claims. 
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II. 
DEFENDANTS CLAIMS THAT HIS PRISON SENTENCE IS 
ILLEGAL AND THAT TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AT SENTENCING LACK LEGAL 
AND RECORD SUPPORT 
In Point III of his brief, Defendant asserts that (1) his prison sentence is illegal 
because he was incompetent to be sentenced; and (2) trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance at sentencing because "[he] did not make any effort to alert the 
court of obvious concern of [sic] [Defendant's] state of mind/7 or "competency/7 
given his history of drug and alcohol abuse. Aplt. Br. at 44; see also id. at 41. Rather, 
trial counsel acknowledged that the PSI recommended imposition of the statutory 
prison term, and advocated that because Defendant needed sex-offender therapy 
and substance-abuse counseling, any commitment order should include those 
services. See R102:7; see also R96 (PSI). As a consequence of trial counsel's failure to 
assert his alleged incompetency at sentencing, Defendant asserts that the trial 
court's imposition of the statutory prison term was necessarily "illegal77 for 
purposes of rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and that trial counsel was 
ineffective. Id. Defendant's claims lack both legal and record support. 
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A. Defendant's statutory prison term is a legal sentence. 
Defendant's assertion that his prison sentence is illegal fails at the outset 
because, contrary to Defendant's characterization, the trial court's imposition of the 
statutory term was not "illegal" for purposes of rule 22(e). Aplt. Br. at 44. 
Rule 22(e) provides that a "court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). "An illegal 
sentence is one which is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it 
is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by 
statute, is uncertain as to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence which the 
judgment of conviction did not authorize." State v. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, f 13, 203 
P.3d 984 (citation and internal marks omitted). A sentence may also be illegal for 
constitutional, jurisdictional, or statutory reasons. See State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32, f 
11, 232 P.3d 1008. 
Here, Defendant's reliance on rule 22(e) is unavailing because he does not 
assert that his sentence is "ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which 
it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by 
statute, is uncertain as to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence which the 
judgment of conviction did not authorize." Yazzie, 2009 UT 14,113. See Aplt. Br. at 
44. To the extent Defendant argues that his alleged incompetence rendered his 
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sentence illegal for constitutional or statutory reasons, see Candedo, 2010 UT 32, % 11, 
Defendant cites no authority establishing that he was entitled to be competent at 
sentencing. See Aplt. Br. at 44. Consequently, Defendant's claim of an illegal 
sentence fails as a matter of law. 
Even if Defendant could show a right to be competent at sentencing, the 
record does not support that he was in fact incompetent. Rather, the record is 
devoid of any indication that Defendant's behavior at sentencing, or any prior 
proceeding suggested that he was incompetent. See R102:10-ll (Defendant's 
statement at sentencing); see also R114 (guilty plea colloquy); R101 (clarification of 
guilty plea colloquy). As sole support for his claim of incompetency, Defendant 
cites his mother's statements at sentencing that" [he] had a major overdose and was 
in the ICU for four (4) days," following the forcible sexual abuse crime to which he 
pleaded guilty, and that he had been hospitalized for detoxification three other 
times "since the incident." Aplt. Br. at 44 (citing Rl02:8-9). Defendant's mother's 
statements at sentencing regarding his various hospitalizations do not establish that 
Defendant was incompetent at sentencing, let alone that counsel reasonably should 
have known that he was incompetent. Indeed, Defendant's participation at 
sentencing and prior court proceedings evinced no sign of incompetency. See 
R102:10-22;R114; R101. Cf. State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, % 49, 63 P.3d 731 
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(recognizing "'[a] trial court must hold a competency hearing when there is 'a 
substantial question of possible doubt as to defendant's competency at the time of 
the guilty plea'" (quoting Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17, If 13, 20 P.3d 382) (in turn 
quoting State v. Holland, 921 R2d 430, 435 (1996))). Consequentely, Defendant 
shows no factual support for his claim of incompetency. His suggestion that his 
prison sentence is somehow illegal under rule 22(e) thus lacks merit and should be 
rejected. 
Finally, given the paucity of evidence to support Defendant's allegation that 
he was incompetent at sentencing, Defendant's claim of incompetency appears to be 
no more than a veiled attack on his guilty plea with a view to obtaining a trial. See 
Aplt. Br. at 48 ("Neither the State nor the victim will be prejudiced by allowing 
[Defendant] his fair trial and effective assistance"). See also Candedo, 2010 UT 32, f 9 
n.2 (recognizing rule 22(e) "cannot be used as a veiled attempt to challenge the 
underlying conviction by challenging the sentence"). Where, as here, "the 
'conviction' being challenged is in the form of a guilty plea and the defendant 
attempts to withdraw that plea using a rule 22(e) challenge," or claim of an illegal 
sentence, "review is barred." State v. Nicholls, 2006 UT 76, f 5,148 P.3d 990. 
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B. Defendant has not, and cannot, show ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel at sentencing. 
In addition to claiming that his prison sentence is illegal, Defendant asserts 
that trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing. Aplt. Br. at 34. As noted, however, 
the only infirmity that Defendant identifies in his sentence is his claim that he was 
incompetent to be sentenced. Aplt. Br. at 44. Defendant claims that trial counsel 
was ineffective for not "alert[ing] the court of obvious concern of [sic] [Defendant's] 
state of mind/' or "competency," given his history of drug and alcohol abuse. Id. 
Like his claim of an illegal prison sentence, Defendant's claim of ineffective 
assistance at sentencing lacks merit. 
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish both 
prongs of the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington: (1) that his counsel's 
performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and (2) that 
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. See 466 U.S. 668,687-688 (1984); see 
also State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994). Failure to establish either 
prong defeats a claim of ineffectiveness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 697. Thus, a 
defendant "raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim carries a 'heavy 
burden.'" Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036,1046 (10th Cir. 2002). There is a "strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
13 
professional assistance/7 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. "This presumption derives 
from our common experience that attorneys, as a whole, usually represent their 
clients in a professional, competent, and reasonable manner/' Bullock, 297 F.3d at 
1046. 
Moreover, this Court "will presume that any argument of ineffectiveness 
presented to it is supported by all the relevant evidence of which defendant is 
aware." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 17,12 P.3d 92. "Where the record appears 
inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply 
will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively." Id. 
Indeed, "'proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter 
but must be demonstrable reality/" Nicholls v. State, 2009 UT 12, t 36,203 R3d 976 
(quoting Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)). Counsel's failure "to 
make motions or objections [that] would be futile if raised does not constitute 
ineffective assistance." State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96,134,989 P.2d 52 (quotations and 
citations omitted). 
Defendant's assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing 
assumes that he had a right to be competent at sentencing, but, as noted, he cites no 
supporting authority for that proposition. See Aplt. Br. at 44. "To establish a claim 
of ineffectiveness based on an oversight or misreading of law, a defendant bears the 
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burden of demonstrating why, on the basis of the law in effect at the time of trial, his 
or her trial counsel's performance was deficient/7 State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1228 
(Utah 1993). Because Defendant cites no authority establishing that he was entitled 
to be competent at sentencing, his assertions that trial counsel was ineffective for not 
asserting his incompetency, and that his sentence was consequently illegal, 
necessarily fail. Id. 
Even assuming arguendo that Defendant had a right to be competent at 
sentencing, his claim of ineffective assistance at sentencing still fails because, as 
shown, Defendant has not provided this Court with a nonspeculative allegation of 
facts, which, if true, could support a determination that he was in fact incompetent 
to be sentenced or that trial counsel rendered deficient and prejudicial performance 
for failing to argue that he was incompetent to be sentenced. 
According to Defendant's brief, trial counsel was aware of his history of 
alcohol and drug abuse. Aplt. Br. at 44 (citing R107:2). Defendant thus necessarily 
challenges trial counsel's tactical decision about what arguments and evidence to 
present at sentencing. However, because of the "strong presumption that counsel's 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance," 
Strickland, 466_U.S. at 689, remand is not available merely to second-guess counsel's 
tactical decisions in hindsight. As noted, the strong presumption of effective 
15 
assistance "derives from our common experience that attorneys, as a whole, usually 
represent their clients in a professional, competent, and reasonable manner/' 
Bullock, 297 F.3d at 1046. Accordingly, "trial tactics and strategies including what 
witnesses to call, what objections to make, and by and large what defenses to put 
forth are within the prerogative of counsel and are generally left to counsel's 
professional judgment/' State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250,1256 (Utah 1993). 
Defendant cannot show either deficient performance or prejudice at 
sentencing by alleging facts that evidence a strategic choice by counsel. See Tyler, 
850 P.2d at 1258-59; see also State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, | 13 n.l, 989 P.2d 1065. 
Rather, to satisfy the deficient performance prong of the ineffective assistance of 
counsel test, Defendant must establish that no objectively reasonable counsel would 
have acted as counsel here did in the same circumstances. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
688-90. Defendant has not made, and cannot make, this showing here. 
Indeed, as shown in Part A, above, the record is devoid of indication that 
Defendant's behavior at sentencing, or any prior proceeding, showed in any respect 
that Defendant was incompetent. See R102:10-ll; R114; R101. And Defendant's 
mother's statements at sentencing regarding his various hospitalizations do not 
establish that Defendant was in fact incompetent at sentencing, or that counsel 
reasonably should have known he was incompetent. R102:9. Cf. Arguelles, 2003 UT 
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1, If 49 (recognizing "trial court must hold a competency hearing when there is a 
substantial question of possible doubt as to defendant's competency at the time of 
the guilty plea" (case citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
Moreover, while Defendant sought a rule 23B remand, it was not for the 
purpose of supplementing the record with his own or anyone else's affidavit 
regarding his alleged incompetency at sentencing, or with trial counsel's affidavit 
regarding counsel' sentencing strategy or lack thereof. See Rule 23B Motion filed 23 
February 2010; see also fn. 1, supra. Defendant's failure to seek to supplement the 
record with such affidavits reasonably suggests that there is no supporting evidence 
to develop regarding his alleged incompetency at sentencing. See Litherland, 2000 
UT 76, 1 16 (quoting Utah R. App. P. 23B and observing that "[i]f a defendant is 
aware of any 'nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on 
appeal, which, if true, could support a determination that counsel was ineffective,' 
defendant bears the primary obligation and burden of moving for a temporary 
remand"). 
Given the absence of any record evidence that Defendant's hospitalizations 
rendered him incompetent at sentencing—assuming Defendant had a right to be 
competent at sentencing—trial counsel performed objectively reasonably in not 
asserting that Defendant was incompent. See Whittle, 1999 UT 96, % 34 (counsel's 
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failure "to make motions or objections [that] would be futile if raised does not 
constitute ineffective assistance"). Rather, recognizing that Defendant was a likely 
candidate for incarceration, the available record supports that trial counsel 
performed objectively reasonably when he requested that the trial court include 
needed sex-offender therapy and substance-abuse counseling in the commitment 
order. See R96 (PSI); see also R102:7-8. 
In sum, even assuming that Defendant had a right to be competent at 
sentencing, Defendant has not shown by a nonspeculative allegation of facts that 
trial counsel performed deficiently and prejudicially at sentencing when he candidly 
recognized that Defendant was likely to be incarcerated and urged the trial court to 
order needed sex-offender therapy and substance-abuse counseling. See R102:7; R96 
(PSR). In the absence of any record evidence that Defedant was in fact incompetent 
at sentencing, Defendant's claims that he was incompetent at sentencing, and that 




For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted 10 March 2011. 
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Chief Deputy Protecting Utah • Protecting You 
KIRK TORGENSEN 
Chief Deputy 
August 3, 2011 
Lisa Collins 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
Re: State v. Lee, 20090652-CA 
Dear Ms. Collins: 
This letter is in response to notice from the Court that while the State's Brief of 
Appellee indicated that a copy of the Fifth District Court Docket (Case No. 100500082) 
in Defendant's post-conviction case was attached to the State's brief, no such copy was, 
in fact, attached thereto. Accordingly, counsel has attached a copy of the docket to the 
instant letter. 
Counsel regrets any inconvenience to the Court. 
Sincerely, 
iRIAN DECKER 
/Assistant Attorney General 
copy: Kenneth L. Combs 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, SIXTH FLOOR • P.O. Box 140854 • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-0854 • TEL: (801) 366-0180 • FAX: (801) 366-0167 
Attachment 
Attachment 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEORGE 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs. WILLIS LEGRAND LEE III 
CASE NUMBER 100500082 Post Conv Rel NonCap 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
JAMES L SHUMATE 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff- STATE OF UTAH 
Represented by: RYAN J SHAUM 
Defendant - WILLIS LEGRAND LEE III 
Represented by: KENNETH L COMBS 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 360.00 
Amount Paid: 360.00 
Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S 
Amount Due: 360.00 
Amount Paid: 360.00 




01-13-10 Filed: Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies 
Act 
01-13-10 Filed: Complaint 
01-14-10 Judge G RAND BEACH AM assigned. 
01-14-10 Fee Account created Total Due: 360.00 
01-14-10 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S Payment Received: 360.00 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S 
04-30-10 Filed: Request for Expedited Trial Setting 
05-05-10 Filed: First Amended Petition for Relief Under the Post 
Conviction Remedies Act 
05-26-10 Notice - NOTICE for Case 100500082 ID 13004254 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF is scheduled. 
Printed: 08/03/11 11:36:30 Page 1 
CASE NUMBER 100500082 Post Conv Rel NonCap 
Date: 06/09/2010 
Time: 09:30 a.m. 
Location: Courtroom 3A 
St. George Courthouse 
206 West Tabernacle 
St. George, UT 84770 
Before Judge: G RAND BEACHAM 
05-26-10 POST CONVICTION RELIEF scheduled on June 09, 2010 at 09:30 AM 
in Courtroom 3A with Judge BEACHAM. 
06-07-10 Filed: Letter from State of Utah Attorney General 
06-08-10 POST CONVICTION RELIEF Cancelled. 
Reason: Def.'s Attorney requested continuance to later date 
07-06-10 REVIEW HEARING scheduled on September 15, 2010 at 11:00 AM in 
Courtroom 3D with Judge SHUMATE. 
07-06-10 Judge JAMES L SHUMATE assigned. 
09-15-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for Review Hearing 
Judge: JAMES L SHUMATE 
Clerk: diannem 
PRESENT 
Defendant's Attorney(s): ARIEL K TAYLOR 
ERIC R GENTRY 
Video 
Tape Number: 3D Tape Count: 11:17/11:19 
HEARING 
Court informs counsel that an amended petition needs to be filed 
and should be within 20 days. At that time a 1/2 day evidentiary 
hearing shall be set. 
10-06-10 Filed: Second Amended Petition for Relief Under the Post 
Conviction Remedies Act 
Printed: 08/03/11 11:36:31 Page 2 (last) 
